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The Ukrainian government’s strategy 
towards the opposition
Tadeusz A. Olszański
In recent months in Ukraine, there has been a toughening of measures tar-
geted at opposition leaders, in particular the former Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko and the former interior minister Yuri Lutsenko. These two have 
been charged with abuses of office when in power. The way in which the 
criminal investigations are being conducted shows that these measures are 
actually meant to prevent the two politicians from conducting regular politi-
cal activities, or at least to make this practically impossible for them. These 
actions are an element of the Party of Regions’ long-term strategy, as it tries 
during the pre-election period to eliminate Yulia Tymoshenko from political 
life and weaken or even destroy her powerbase. Similar measures, although 
to a more limited extent, are being taken against other opposition groups. 
These actions are leading to the lowering of democratic standards in Ukra-
ine, although these are still much higher than in Belarus or Russia; this has 
been proved, among other things, by the militia’s more restrained behaviour 
towards the protesters, and the fact that abuses of the law during the cur-
rent investigations have not yet slipped into actual violations. The Ukrainian 
opposition is fragmented and disorganised; even the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
is unable to stage a major campaign in defence of its leader. This allows the 
authorities to feel free to tighten their policy towards the opposition.
The pre-election situation in Ukraine
After Viktor Yanukovych assumed power, the Party of Regions quickly and successfully 
formed a parliamentary majority and a government, extended the influence of the executive 
power over the judiciary, and restored the presidential-parliamentary system. All of these 
actions were accompanied by surprisingly feeble protests on the part of the opposition, 
whose weakness and lack of orientation were confirmed in the campaign preceding the 
local elections in autumn last year, in which the Party of Regions significantly increased its 
level of influence. The president’s associates and the Party’s top leadership considered this 
a stimulus to increase pressure on the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (the only opposition force that 
matters) and marginalise it before the parliamentary elections. 
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The amendment of the constitution has resulted in a legal dilemma: the current Verkhovna 
Rada (Ukrainian parliament) was elected for a five-year term, but according to a clause 
in the restored constitution, the term is now four years. According to the former version 
the parliamentary elections should be organised in autumn 2012; according to the latter, 
in spring 2011. The Party of Regions decided to amend the constitution once more, and 
has announced that the elections will take place in October 2012. In this way the ruling 
coalition will gain time to implement unpopular reforms, and at the same time win back 
public support for the Party of Regions. A poll carried out by the Razumkov Centre shows 
that the proportion of people who want to vote for the Party of Regions fell from 41.5% 
in May 2010 to 29.0% in November 2010, while declared support for President Yanuko-
vych fell in the same period from 40% to 20% (no further polls have been taken). 
The case of Yulia Tymoshenko
After the local elections, the General Public Prosecutor’s Office and other law enforcement 
bodies launched forceful actions against Yulia Tymoshenko. In December last year she was 
repeatedly summoned to appear at the General Public Prosecutor’s Office for questioning, 
and on 20 December she was formally charged with abuse of power; a preventive measure 
in the form of prohibition on leaving her 
city of residence was introduced. Earlier 
investigations had been made against 
her, a number of high officials from her 
government had been arrested (including 
the former environment minister Heorhiy 
Fylypchuk, the former head of the Ukrhaz-
prom company Ivan Didenko, and the for-
mer head of the State Customs Service 
Anatoli Makarenko), and in October 2010 
an arrest warrant from Ukraine led to the detention of the former minister of the economy 
Bohdan Danylyshyn in the Czech Republic. All of these actions are meant mainly as attacks 
on the former prime minister. 
The charge brought against Tymoshenko concerns the alleged illegal transfer of US$300 
mln, earned from the sale of CO2 emission quotas to Japan, to finance old age and disability 
pensions (in line with the conditions of such transactions, the funds can be spent only on 
environmental investments agreed with the purchasing party). The former prime minister 
does not deny the charge, although she claims that the transfer was a kind of ‘loan’, and 
that the relevant funds were returned to the specific bank account. Members of the current 
government however argue that it was actually Prime Minister Azarov who ‘returned’ these 
funds. Irrespective of the facts, the legal qualification adopted by the prosecutor’s office 
is striking: the cited article of the penal code refers to actions undertaken to obtain personal 
gain, which in this case is out of the question. 
The prosecutor’s office is conducting several other investigations concerning the abuse of 
power by Tymoshenko’s government. These include the purchase of ambulances for the emer-
gency medical service which are not fit for their purpose, and embezzlement associated with 
the purchase of flu vaccines. In the first case, an investigation against Tymoshenko was laun-
ched on 27 January, although in the second no personal charges have been brought so far. 
The Ukrainian constitution does not contain provisions on constitutional liability, and so the 
charges made in relation to abuse of office by the highest-ranking state officials are being in-
vestigated by the prosecutor’s offices and common courts. The constitution does not allow for 
combining the function of a member of parliament with a job in the offices of executive power 
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(including as prime minister and minister), and so dismissed members of the government, 
who hold no parliamentary immunity, can be tried in criminal proceedings. The Ukrainian 
constitution further stipulates that persons who have received a legally valid sentence for 
committing an intentional crime lose their right to stand in parliamentary elections.
Irrespective of the assessment of the charges, there is no doubt that in this case, the aim of 
the General Public Prosecutor’s Office is to prevent Yulia Tymoshenko from conducting any 
political activity, and indirectly, to speed up the disintegration of her bloc. It is also beyond 
doubt that the prosecutor’s office (which in Ukraine is not an independent state service) 
is following guidelines from the President’s administration. The long-term aim of these ac-
tions seems to be removing Tymoshenko from political life by preventing her from running 
for a parliamentary seat, as she is the only 
politician who can currently compete with 
President Viktor Yanukovych. This, howe-
ver, would require a legally valid sentence 
to be passed on her, even if suspended. 
According to a poll conducted by the Ra-
zumkov Centre, support for Yulia Tymo-
shenko fell from 17.6% in February 2010 
to 10.1% in April 2010, and continued to 
hold around 10% until November (no later 
data are available). No other politician re-
presenting the Ukrainian opposition enjoy-
ed double-digit support at that time. Although Tymoshenko’s image is clouded by the me-
mory of the permanent political crisis while she was in power, she remains the most popular 
opposition leader, with the greatest number of supporters and the best powerbase. Polls 
analysing the support for political parties clearly show that it is only the Yulia Tymoshenko 
Bloc that could form an opposition grouping of any importance in the new parliament. 
Concurrent actions aimed at destroying the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc’s structures across the 
country have been launched. Some time ago, several Bloc deputies joined the coalition for-
ces, and in certain regions the conflicts within the party leadership circles (most probably 
fuelled by external influences) have led to a split and the forming of alternative leadership 
structures. The consolidation of the power held by the Party of Regions has led numerous 
entrepreneurs to withdraw their support for the Bloc. After the local elections many depu-
ties and even mayors (including the mayor of Zaporizhia, Oleksandr Sin) who were in favour 
of the Bloc became supporters of the Party of Regions, officially or unofficially. The limita-
tion of the actions that Tymoshenko can undertake facilitates these processes, as both the 
Bloc and its main force, the Fatherland (Bat’kivshchyna) party, are actually centred around 
one leader.
The case of Yuri Lutsenko and others
On 27 December 2010, the former interior minister in the Tymoshenko government, Yuri 
Lutsenko, was detained on charges of abuse of power and breaking the law during the super-
vision of the investigation focused on the alleged poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko, involving 
the promotion of his driver to an important post, and the improper spending of state funds 
for celebrations marking Militia Day. The pretext for Lutsenko’s detention was his repeated 
refusal to review the investigation files, and the arrest was performed in a spectacular way 
(early in the morning, when Lutsenko was walking his dog). The aim of this action was to 
speed up the destruction of his People’s Self-Defence party, which currently enjoys minor 
public support, but could inspire civil unrest. However, the main motive behind the actions 
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against Lutsenko seems to be revenge, by both deputy prime minister Boris Kolesnikov 
(who was detained in 2005 on an order issued by Lutsenko with insufficient grounds) and 
the top leadership of the interior ministry, who have always been hostile towards Lutsenko, 
as he was one of the leaders of the Orange Revolution. 
Other cases of persecution against the opposition include the investigations carried out 
against the organisers of last year’s protests by small businessmen who opposed the new 
fiscal law; the surprisingly large number of people arrested in connection with the destruc-
tion of the monument to Stalin in Zaporizhia on 31 December; and the arrest of the former 
justice minister Yevhen Korniychuk. The first case seems simplest: the mass questioning of 
the organisers and main attendees of the protest and the minor charges laid against some 
of them (such as damage to the paving caused when putting up their tents) are meant to 
discourage others from engaging in protests against certain economic and social develop-
ments, which is a prospect the state fears in the context of the gradual implementation of 
unpopular reforms. 
In the second case, after the demolition of the Stalin monument erected by the local struc-
ture of the Communist Party of Ukraine, several members of two organisations, the Tryzub 
association and the Svoboda party, were arrested. The charges against the members of 
Tryzub are possibly justified, as the organisation admitted to having damaged the monu-
ment some time ago. However, the arrests of the members of the local organisation of 
the nationalist party Svoboda, which in the 2010 local elections also won a surprisingly 
large number of votes in central Ukraine, 
seem to be an attempt to eradicate it from 
those regions, and at the same time is 
an element of ‘regulating’ the political sce-
ne before the upcoming elections. 
In the third case, Korniychuk, who was ar-
rested on 22 December and is suspected 
of breaking the law during public procure-
ment procedures on legal services, is the 
leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic 
Party (a marginal party which is a com-
ponent of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc), 
and at the same time the son-in-law of Vasyl Onopenko, the Chairman of the Supreme 
Court of Ukraine. According to Ukrainian commentators, this latter fact is the motive be-
hind Korniychuk’s arrest. Onopenko, who is a long-time collaborator of Yulia Tymoshenko, 
is continuing to prevent the Party of Regions from expanding its influence onto the country’s 
highest judicial body, at least till the end of 2011, when his term in office expires. Unable to 
remove him from office, the Party of Regions by implementing judicial reform in 2010 has 
significantly reduced the Supreme Court’s scope of competence. In the light of the current 
penal code, the grounds for Korniychuk’s arrest are weak, and it does not seem to constitute 
an attempt to put pressure on Onopenko, but is rather just an act of malice. 
Summary
Representatives of the Ukrainian government have denied that the events discussed above 
are acts of political repression, and claim that the country’s prosecutor’s offices are conduc-
ting over 160 corruption investigations, only a small number of which are cases against politi-
cal figures. The charges of abuse of power and breaking the law by the country’s top officials 
sound probable, particularly in the light of the fact that corruption in Ukraine is omnipresent, 
and a large portion of the law (including the public procurement regulations) encourages 
The charges of abuse of power and 
breaking the law by the country’s 
top officials sound probable. What 
is questionable, however, is the fact 
that the criminal investigations are 
only being carried out against the 
politicians associated with the Yulia 
Tymoshenko Bloc, and not the Party 
of Regions or the parties related to it.
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corruption. What is questionable, however, is the fact that the criminal investigations are only 
being carried out against the politicians associated with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, and not 
the Party of Regions or the parties related to it; their involvement in corruption scandals has 
been widely covered by the media. These cases include the illegal privatisation of a state re-
sidence to the benefit of Viktor Yanukovych (as the outgoing prime minister in 2007), during 
which several high officials actually broke the law. The charge of selective application of the 
law in the cases of corruption crimes in Ukraine is justified. 
The opposition’s evident impotence is a good omen for the authorities. The Yulia Tymoshenko 
Bloc has proved unable to stage any major protests in her defence; similarly, People’s Self- 
-Defence has failed to defend its leader. This 
encourages the authorities to continue the ac-
tions aimed at marginalising the opposition. 
The Party of Regions has managed to re-
vive the viewpoint which associates demo-
cracy with chaos and an uncertain future 
(popular in the early 1990s), and to use 
the general disappointment with the rule 
of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshen-
ko to its advantage. The Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko governments have been presented as “democratic” and are contrasted with the 
current government, “pragmatic” and efficient. In this way, the Party of Regions is increasing 
the social isolation of the main opposition parties 
The question of whether the Ukrainian authorities will decide to bring the opposition leader to 
trial remains open. It is unlikely that she will be detained, as this might cause a surge in her 
popularity. A social reaction similar to the one in 2001 (when Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested 
after resigning as deputy prime minister, and the time she spent in custody brought her the 
status of a leader) is not very likely, yet the authorities must be taking it into consideration.
The falling standards of liberal democracy over the past year and the new Ukrainian govern-
ment’s efforts to create elements of ‘guided democracy’ are disturbing. So far, however, no-
thing suggests that a ‘Putinisation’ of Ukrainian political life, or the choice of the ‘Belarusian 
way’ are imminent. The Western countries have not questioned the democratic legitimacy of 
the Ukrainian government (as in the case of Belarus); the militia have responded to street 
protests in a restrained way, and the actions targeted at the opposition involve excessive use 
of detention, subjecting the detainees to unnecessary questioning, etc., but this is not real 
persecution. Finally, the actions aimed at disorganising the opposition, as much as they de-
serve criticism, fit into the rules of the political game which is largely acceptable in Ukraine. 
The most important observation to be made is that the political groups which currently hold 
power in Ukraine feel free to pursue their policies, which might result in the intensification 
of actions aimed at weakening the democratic mechanisms.
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